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This article aims at identifying the determinants of currency crises in Turkey the period 1980:01-2006:06. 
Following a general-to-specific model selection methodology, a broad set of pre-selected variables were tested 
through bivariate logit regressions. Significant variables were then used in a multivariate logit model. Strong 
evidence emerged that current account balance/GDP, short-term debt/long-term debt, domestic credit/GDP, 
foreign liabilities/foreign assets of banks, and fiscal balance/GDP are significant with correct signs. The 
measures of goodness-of-fit and in-sample predictive power of the model turned out to be favorable. The 
resulting model correctly calls 87.18% and 73.08% of the months at 10% and 20% levels, respectively. 
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I. Introduction 
   The aim of the present research is to empirically investigate the significant indicators of currency crises 
in Turkey in the period 1980:01-2006:06. We follow a methodology that improves upon the earlier empirical 
work in the related literature. In the majority of the earlier studies, attempts are made to describe the discrete 
crisis variable with a set of explanatory variables. The novelty of the present approach is that only the variables 
that have been pre-selected according to their noise-to-signal ratios through the signals approach in a recent 
study by Feridun (2006) are taken into consideration. Focusing on a set of variables whose empirical relevance 
to currency crises have already been established, the present analysis will try to answer the question whether the 
implicitly embedded functional relationship between the binary crisis variable and the selected individual 
indicators is justified. This will be done by means of logit regressions following a general-to-specific model 
selection methodology. 
   The major contribution of the present article to the existing literature is that it is the first country-
specific approach applying this methodology to Turkey. Although some country-specific empirical work has 
been done on Turkey particularly to analyze the crises of 1994 and 2001, no work has been done using a sample 
that includes the extended periods of economic turbulence that the country suffered in the early 1980s
2. In 
addition, the turmoil of 2006 has not been taken into consideration to date except a recent study by Feridun 
(2006), which forms the basis of the present analysis. The present article fills a gap in the related literature 
through analyzing a period that has not been analyzed before and employing a methodology that coherently 
combines two popular empirical approaches used in the existing literature. 
  The rest of the article is structured as follows: The next section will review the earlier applications of 
the signals approach. Section III will introduce the data used and the methodology that is followed. Section IV 
will present the empirical results and the last section will point out the conclusions that emerge from the study.  
 
II, Literature Review 
   Applications of logit models in the literature on currency crises began with Goldfjan and Valdes (1997) 
and Klein and Marion (1997). Goldfjan and Valdes (1997) use logit regressions based on three separate crisis 
definitions for 26 countries to investigate the predictability of currency crises. Using the crisis episodes reported 
by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996), they find that the only variable that helps to explain the presence of crises is 
overvaluation. Hence, the authors conclude that currency crises are largely unpredictable. Klein and Marion 
                                                           
1 This paper is based on the author’s Ph.D. thesis being prepared under the supervision of Prof. David T. 
Llewellyn and Prof. Eric Pentecost at Department of Economics, Loughborough University. The author would 
like to thank both supervisors  for helpful comments and discussions on his Ph.D. thesis. The usual disclaimers 
apply. 
2 See Feridun (2006) for a review of the literature on currency crises in Turkey. 
  2(1997) end up with dissimilar results for 17 Latin American countries and Jamaica over the period between 1957 
and 1991. The authors use a logit model to identify factors that influence the duration of currency pegs in a 
panel of monthly data. Results of their regression identify significant variables as sharp real appreciations as 
well as losses of foreign currency reserves. The authors also note that the predictive power of their model is 
quite high with probabilities as high as 0.89. Likewise, Kumar et al. (1998) use logit model for estimating the 
probability of crises for developing countries throughout the period of 1985:1-1998:3. To evaluate the model 
they calculate the trading strategies in which an investor goes long or short in the currency depending on 
whether crash probabilities are low or high. They find that variables having the highest explanatory power are 
low output and export growth rate and international reserves. They also report that their regressions have power 
to predict currency crises. Kumar et al. (2002) use the model for the period 1985 to 1999. They focus only on 
successful speculative attacks, and use only exchange rate changes to define crisis episodes. The authors 
evaluate forecasts on an out-of-sample basis, estimating the model for one part of the sample, and then 
forecasting crashes in the remaining sample period. They use various accuracy scores, goodness-of-fit tables and 
one-third of total observations for out of sample evaluation of their model. Their analysis fails to yield 
conclusive empirical evidence.  
     Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002) develop a multinomial logit model based on a variety of variables to 
predict financial crises in 32 emerging market economies between 1993 and 2001. Results of the regression 
reveal that the model would have correctly predicted the majority of crises in emerging markets. For the in-
sample estimation, the model fails to anticipate only two of the emerging market crises in the sample. For the 
out-of-sample estimation, the model anticipates correctly most of the countries that were affected by the Asian 
crisis. Hence, the authors conclude that model predicts most currency crises in emerging markets during the 
1990s, both in-sample and out-of-sample. They also note that the financial contagion channel, in particular, was 
an important factor in explaining currency crises in the sample. Jacobs et al (2004) estimate a logit model for 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand for the period between January 1970 
and December 2001. The authors build different logit models for different versions of currency crises based on a 
broad set of indicators which they combine into factors using the factor analysis methodology. As a result of the 
factor analysis and the logit regressions, they find that the rates of growth of M1 and M2, GDP per capita, 
national savings, and import growth correlate with all definitions of currency crises. The authors also note that 
using the first differences of indicators instead of levels improves the predictive power of the model.  
   A detailed summary of the literature on the application of logit models is given in Appendix I. Overall, 
diverse applications of logit and probit models vary vastly in terms of the indices and the thresholds they use. 
These studies identified some significant variables as the common determinants of the crises both in single and 
multi-country studies. The present country-specific analysis aims of applying this methodology to explain the 
currency crises in Turkey.  
 
III. Data and Methodology 
  Following the establishment of the relevance of the chosen set of variables as the leading indicators of 
currency crises through signals approach by Feridun (2006), the present article tests the validity of the functional 
relationship between the dichotomous variable of currency crises using logit analysis, which is a statistically 
more rigorous approach. The first step is the selection of potential explanatory variables. 
 
Data 
   The present research does not attempt to break new ground in terms of the choice or definition of 
variables. It employs the data set used in a recent study by Feridun (2006)
3 who used signals approach to 
investigate the currency crises in Turkey. These variables are drawn from the literature and the theories of 
currency crises and sufficiently reflect the conditions of current account, capital account, financial sector, real 
sector, fiscal sector, the global economy and the political setting
4. Data is monthly, spans the period 1980:01-
2006:06
5, and is obtained from various sources such as the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database, the 
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey’s Electronic Data Dissemination System, as well as the World Bank’s 
                                                           
3 The author considered 38 variables and identified 28 variables whose noise-to-signal ratios are below unity, i.e. 
emits more good signals than false alarms. 
4 A detailed description of the source of the series and the rationale of using them are given in Feridun (2007).  
5 Some variables were available only after mid-1980s. These variables are only tested in individual regressions 
based on the available period for each series. These are deposit money banks’ net past due loans/total loans, 
Central Bank credit to public sector/GDP, bank reserves/bank assets, commercial bank loans to public sector, 
stock market index, and portfolio investments/GDP. 
  3World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance Statistics databases. Some series have been 
linearly interpolated from annual and quarterly data where monthly series were not available.  
   A disadvantage of using low frequency data is the possible presence of seasonal effects. This problem 
is circumvented by using the data in 12-month percentage changes following, inter alia, Eliasson and Kreuter 
(2001) and Jacobs et al (2004)
6. A visual inspection of the data confirms that all these series are I(0), i.e. they 
have no unit root(s). Table 1, constructed following Manasse et al. (2003) and Trebeschi and Ciarlone (2006), 
gives the respective mean of each variable in the entire sample, for non-crisis episodes, for 12 months before the 
onset of a crisis, and for in-crisis months.  
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
In general, the path of means from non-crisis to entry into crisis and finally exit from crisis is as expected. Most 
current account, capital account, financial sector, real sector, and fiscal sector variables generally indicate a 
worsening of the macroeconomic situation in the run-up to a crisis. They are also generally worse relative to 
tranquil months.  
 
Crisis Definition 
   A priori, there is no single empirical definition of what should constitute a currency crisis. In the 
present study, currency crises are defined in the same way as in Feridun (2006). An index is built using the 
changes in exchange rates, interest rates, and international reserves of the Central Bank. The weights attached to 
the three components of the index, which are the inverse of the standard deviation for each component, equalize 
the volatilities of the three components and prevents the component with the highest volatility dominating the 
index. The index is calculated as follows:  
 
EMPt = αΔet + βΔ(it - i*t) - γ(Δτ,t-Δr*t)                                (1) 
  
where α, β and γ are weights that equalize the conditional volatilities of each component. More specifically, 
α=(1/σe), β=(1/σi) and γ=(1/σr) where σe is the standard deviation of et, σi is the standard deviation of (it - i*t) and 
σr is the standard deviation of (Δτ,t-Δr*t). Δeit is the monthly change in the exchange rate, i denotes the domestic 
interest rate, i*t corresponds to the same variable but for the country of reference, τ,t is the ratio of foreign 
reserves to domestic money (M1) for the domestic country and, r*t denotes the same concept for the country of 
reference. The higher the standard deviation, the lower weight would be imposed on the corresponding variable. 
The index captures either a successful attack (a sharp devaluation), or a successful defense (the exchange rate 
remains unchanged but the monetary authorities deter an attack by a combination of interest rate increases and 
foreign market interventions), or an unsuccessful defense (all three variables move sharply). A positive value of 
the index measures the depreciation pressure of the currency that can be signaled by a nominal depreciation, a 
widening of the interest rate spread, or a loss of foreign reserves, whereas a negative value of the index 
measures the appreciation pressure of the currency. Data used to calculate the index are as follows: Exchange 
rate is the TL/USD nominal exchange rate, interest rate is the nominal exchange rates (3-month deposit rate for 
Turkey and prime loan rate for USA), international reserves are reserves-gold and M1 is the narrow money 
(M1). A crisis month is defined as any month in which this index is more than 1.5 standard deviations above its 
mean. A dummy variable is constructed that takes the value of one if a crisis occurs and zero if otherwise. The 
value of 1.5 is used following Herrera and Garcia (1999) as it gives the best estimation of crises
7. The pressure 




  Having identified the crisis episodes and the variables, we can now set up an econometric model that 
builds upon the results of Feridun (2006).
8 Following Manasse et al (2003), Linne and Bruggemann (2003), and 
                                                           
6 This filter is not used for: the deviation of the real exchange rate from the trend, excess of real M1 balances, 
and the interest rates.  
 
7  Feridun (2006) tested different thresholds and found that a higher threshold misses the currency crunch of 
May 2006 whereas a lower threshold leads to too many crisis episodes. 
8 Using signals approach, Feridun (2006) eliminated real effective exchange rate overvaluation, industrial 
production index, trade balance/GDP, stock market index, public debt/GDP, domestic real interest rates, 
  4Krznar (2004), the candidate variables will be successively eliminated by applying a general-to-specific model 
selection methodology. Before moving to a multivariate framework, a logit model with two variables is used to 
test the possibility of any functional forms between the dependent variable of a currency crisis and the 
contemporaneous values of the explanatory variables. Variables that are significant at 10% are selected into the 
final model.  
  Since the dependent variable is a binary variable, we use a binary choice model. Two popular binary 
choice models are the probit and logit models. The major difference is that the probit model is based on the 
normal distribution, whereas the logit model uses an S-shaped logistic function to constrain the probabilities to 
the [0,1] interval. Predicted probabilities calculated by these models in practice only slightly differ (Jacobs et al, 
2004). In both models, an econometric regression is run on various variables to explain a dichotomous indicator 
equal to one (Y=1) if a crisis occurs within the specified time period, or equal to zero (Y=0) if otherwise. The 
probability that Y=1 is a continuous, monotonically increasing or decreasing function of a single variable X.  
This can be written as: 
 
Prob(Yi=1) = F(a + bXi) (1) 
 
where F(Z) is some continuous, monotonic function of Z, bounded between 0 and 1, and Zi = a + bXi. More than 
one explanatory variable may be incorporated as: 
 





j Xij (2) 
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This may be maximized numerically to obtain Maximum Likelihood estimates of the parameters. Cumulative 
probability distribution functions have the property that they are monotonically increasing and bounded between 
0 and 1. Therefore any continuous probability distribution function is a candidate for F(Z). The Probit model has 
the property that Prob(Y=1) approaches 1 very rapidly as X and therefore Z increase, and approaches 0 very 
rapidly as X and Z decrease (assuming b > 0).  In order to allow 0 and 1 to be approached more slowly, the 









  (3.4) 
 
may instead be used for F(Z).  By analogy to the Probit, this is called the Logit model. Probit and Logit models 
resolve some of the disadvantages associated with the signals approach. For instance, indicators are not 
transformed into dummies. So, information on the relative importance of each indicator is retained. Besides, they 
consider the significance of all variables simultaneously, making it easy to examine the explanatory power of 
new variables. Furthermore, regression results are easily interpreted as the probability of a currency crisis 
occurrence.  
   Compared to the probit model, the logit typically performs better when the dependent variable is not 
evenly distributed between the two outcomes (Manesse et al, 2003). In our data, only 28 percent of all outcomes 
are crisis entries. Therefore, we opt for a logit model. Normally, a logit model should consist of the variables in 
lagged form. However, it is hard to test long lags of monthly variables and also hard to decide how many 
observations should one go back. In order to circumvent this issue, following, inter alia, Berg et al (1999), 
Komilainen and Lukkarilla (2003), and Krznar (2004), the present study defines a crisis as not only the crisis 
month, but also the eleven months before since potential explanatory variables are expected to worsen prior to 
crises. In other words, a 1-year crisis window is used. Thus, the values of a currency crisis variable are equal to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
government changes, oil prices, M1 and FDI/GDP based on their noise-to-signal ratios. We will retain these 
variables in order to check whether logit regressions would confirm the author’s results. 
 
  5one not only in the month of the crisis but also in the preceding 11 months. This allows the use of data without 
any lags and increases the number of ones in the sample from a statistical standpoint (Krznar, 2004). 
   Before moving to a multivariate framework, separate logit models with two variables are built to test 
the possibility of any functional forms between the dependent binary crisis variable and the explanatory 
variables. This is done because a logit model cannot accommodate all 38 variables simultaneously. As Krznar 
(2004) explains, introduction of a large number of independent variables in the model increases the probability 
of linear dependence between individual independent variables, i.e. multicollinearity. The consequence is the 
impossibility of inverting the matrix of values of independent variables in the iterative manner to evaluate the 
probit model parameters, since this would be the case of a near-singular matrix (a matrix without a full rank). 
Therefore, only the variables that are significant at 10% level with correct signs are selected into the final logit 
model. 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
   Table 2 presents the results of bivariate logit models which investigate the possibility of functional 
forms between the dependent variable of currency crises and the contemporaneous values of the individual 
explanatory variables. The size of each estimated coefficient reflects the relative effect of the variable on the 
predicted probability for the dependent variable, i.e. the binary crisis index. The sign of each coefficient shows 
the direction of the change in the probability of falling in the endpoint rankings when the independent variables 
change. Positive values imply that increasing the variable will increase the probability of the crises while 
negative values imply the opposite. Interpretation of the coefficient values is complicated by the fact that 
estimated coefficients from a binary dependent model cannot be interpreted as the marginal effect on the 
dependent variable. Hence, marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the probability of crises are 
estimated by taking the derivative of the parameter estimates. 
 
<Table 2 about here> 
 
Results of the variable-by-variable logit regressions show that current account balance/GDP, short-term 
debt/long-term debt, domestic credit/GDP, foreign liabilities/foreign assets of banks, and fiscal balance/GDP are 
significant. The signs of all coefficients coincide with what we expect from economic theory. The probability of 
crises increases when current account balance and fiscal balance deteriorate, and when foreign liabilities of 
banks, domestic credit and short-term debt increases. Short-term debt/long-term debt has the largest marginal 
impact on the probability of a crisis. Based on the results of the variable-by-variable analysis, we now combine 
those variables that appear to help predict crises into a general logit model.
9  
 
<Table 3 about here> 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the final logit model. Estimated coefficients represent the impact of a one-unit 
increase in the independent variable, holding the other explanatory variables constant, on the log of the odds of 
the crisis index. The results indicate that the movements in the explanatory variables are correlated with the 
incidence of financial crises in the expected manner. The statistical characteristics of the model are also 
favorable. All the variables are significant to the level of 10%. The LR measure confirms the general statistical 
significance of the model. Hypothesis of no significance of all the coefficients in the model was rejected with 
significance at 1% level. In addition, McFadden R-squared indicates fairly good goodness-of-fit for the model. 
   We carry out two sensitivity tests to see how robust the estimated logit model is. First we drop 
observations with extreme values for the variables included in the logit. The direction of influence of the 
variables for which the extreme values are removed remains unchanged, and the coefficient estimates do not 
exhibit large falls in the z value. Second, we re-enter several random variables that dropped out of the 
specification process into the model to ensure that our specification process was not adversely affected by an 
omitted variable bias. In none of these cases do we see the model's goodness-of-fit improved. Hence, we 
conclude that the results of the model are robust. 
 
<Table 4 about here> 
 
                                                           
9 Before movıng to multivariate analysis we check the series for multicolllinerarity. We see that some variables 
are strongly correlated but not the ones that we will use in the analysis. See Appendix II for the results. 
 
  6   Following Berg and Patillo (1999) and Linne and Bruggemann (2003), we also assess the power of the 
model in predicting crises in the sample. The standard method compares the estimated probabilities of a crisis 
with actual occurrences. To this end, a probability threshold was set to serve as a criterion for the decision 
whether a model signals a crisis or not. The probability threshold, as the value separating the pre-crisis period 
from the tranquil period, was set at 10% and 20%. Results indicate that the model has considerable potential to 
predict a currency crisis in the sample. The model correctly calls 87.18% and 73.08% of the months at 10% and 
20% levels, respectively. 
 
V. Conclusions 
The results obtained in this study suggest that high fiscal deficits increased the vulnerability of the 
Turkish economy to crises. Besides, reliance of short-term debt increased the country’s exposure to sharp 
increases in interest rates which may have additional negative consequences as the government might have 
needed to increase taxes to service the debt. In addition, high current account deficits made the country 
vulnerable to expectation shifts and less capable to generate external revenue to finance a balance of payments 
problem. As to the banking sector, excessive growth of domestic credit caused balance sheet problems for banks 
in terms of non-performing loans and currency mismatches, and increased the fragility of the banking sector. 
Another result that verifies this verdict is that foreign liabilities/foreign assets of banks were significant showing 
exposure of banks to exchange rate risk.  
  Combined with the results of Feridun (2006), the present research reveals the most important 
explanatory variables of crises. Although identification of these variables can not replace the sound judgment of 
policy-makers in guiding policy, it can still play an important role in emphasizing the areas that require special 
attention. Nevertheless, there is scope for further improvements in several areas. For instance, the sample period 
can be divided into subsets to investigate if the results would change  Also, more work needs to be done to 
check how much different definitions of the crisis index would affect the results. Finally, although it seems to be 
a difficult attempt, further indicators related to political circumstances could be included in the empirical 
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Government consumption/GDP  0.022039 0.052561  0.066117 0.096266 
US Real T-Bill Rate  0.003395 0.003097  0.004185 0.003829 
US GDP  0.004494 0.004144  0.005213 0.004590 
GDP per capita  0.046228 0.042630  0.043624 0.048077 
Fiscal Balance/GDP  0.021224 0.019572  0.004620 0.035847 
Commercial Bank Loans to Public Sector  0.042612 0.039296  0.049430 0.071970 
Excess real M1 balances  0.004945 0.004560  0.004336 0.004352 
International Reserves/GDP  -0.00095 -0.000510 -0.002900 -0.000766 
M2 Multiplier  0.004512 0.007174  0.009024 0.013139 
Foreign Liabilities/Foreign Assets of Banks  0.053854 0.055625  0.057708 0.056823 
Bank reserves/bank assets   -0.00349 -0.004439 -0.005584 -0.008130 
Imports  0.022109 0.028121  0.035374 0.041505 
Commercial Bank Deposits  0.042814 0.044457  0.068502 0.059739 
Exports  0.021317 0.027114 -0.034107 0.049660 
M2/International Reserves  0.034023 0.043276  0.014437 0.029260 
Banking  Sector Fragility Index  0.052231  0.066436 0.063570 0.051678 
Commercial Bank Loans to Private Sector  0.026011 0.033085  0.021618 0.020596 
Capital Inflows/GDP  0.034372 0.033720  0.034995 0.030073 
Reserve Money/GDP  0.021399 0.027218  0.034238 0.049851 
Domestic Credit/GDP  0.024567 0.023671  0.027197 0.025039 
CPI Growth  0.001889 0.001051  0.002322 0.002925 
Short-Term Debt/Long-Term Debt  0.000288 0.000161  0.000202 0.000294 
Short Term Debt/International Reserves  -0.02044 -0.011375 -0.014308 -0.020832 
Portfolio investments/GDP   -0.59188 -0.329371 -0.414316 -0.603244 
Deposit money banks net past due loans/total loans  0.049121 0.037335  0.034385 0.040065 
Central Bank Credit to Public Sector/GDP   0.053863 0.029974  0.037704 0.054897 
Current Account Balance/GDP  2.859585 2.819904  2.578755 2.490667 
Real Interest Rate Differential  0.057832 -0.137925  0.173496  0.252610 
Real Effective Exchange Rate Overvaluation  0.044666 0.106525  0.043998 0.045101 
Industrial Production Index  0.002788 0.006649  0.008364 0.002178 
Trade Balance/GDP  0.747123 0.950312  0.095397 0.740498 
Stock Market Index   0.070561 0.089751  0.072898 0.064379 
Public Debt/GDP  -0.01512 -0.019232 -0.024192 -0.035224 
Domestic Real Interest Rates  0.061227 0.067878  0.077963 0.082634 
Oil prices  0.007263 0.008238  0.011621 0.011920 
M1  0.045152 0.057431  0.072243 0.065186 
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Z-Statistic P>|z| Marginal 
Effectª 
Government consumption/GDP  +  -0.7700 1.0879 -0.7078  0.4791  -0.2149 
US Real T-Bill Rate  +  0.0088 0.4113 0.0214  0.9829 -0.0021 
Fiscal Balance/GDP  -  -4.7127  2.6593  -1.7722*  0.0764  -0.1751 
GDP per capita  -  -1.6339  1.6072  -1.0166  0.3094  -0.4195 
US  GDP  -  0.2651 0.6537 0.4056  0.6850  0.0613 
Commercial Bank Loans to Public Sector  +  -0.6245  0.9711  -0.6431  0.5202  0.0897 
Excess real M1 balances  +  -0.2079  2.0187  -0.1030  0.9180  -0.0552 
International Reserves/GDP  -  -0.4090 0.6577 -0.6219  0.5340  -0.1126 
M2 Multiplier  +  0.2473  2.8915 0.0855  0.9318  0.0660 
Foreign Liabilities/Foreign Assets of Banks  +  1.5593  0.9089 1.7155*  0.0862  0.4119 
Bank reserves/bank assets  -  1.1098  2.2128  0.5015  0.6160  0.1872 
Imports  +  -0.1513 0.8345 -0.1812  0.8562  -0.0294 
Commercial Bank Deposits  -  -4.4221  3.4461  -1.2831  0.1994  -1.2440 
Exports  -  0.2451 1.0238 0.2394  0.8108  0.0623 
M2/International Reserves  +  -30.4023  8.8881  -8.4205  0.5446  -7.3167 
Banking  Sector Fragility Index  + -11.9937  5.9226  -2.0251 0.1429  -2.8606 
Commercial Bank Loans to Private Sector  +  -0.6245  0.9711  -0.6431  0.5202  -0.0745 
Capital  Inflows/GDP  +  -0.0048 0.0324 -0.1493  0.8813  -0.0013 
Reserve  Money/GDP  -  -0.8836 1.1258 -0.7849  0.4325  -0.2314 
Domestic Credit/GDP  +  9.2843  2.9463  3.1511***  0.0016  2.6473 
CPI  Growth  +  -0.4927 1.1665 -0.4224  0.6728  -0.1339 
Short-Term Debt/Long-Term Debt  +  46.0486  8.0992  5.6856***  0.0000  13.2777 
Short Term Debt/International Reserves  +  -0.0130  0.1754  -0.0742  0.9409  -0.0027 
Portfolio  investments/GDP  -  0.0114 0.0215 0.5324  0.5945  0.0020 
Deposit money banks net past due loans/total  loans  +  0.0422 0.8890 0.0474  0.9622  0.0106 
Central Bank Credit to Public Sector/GDP  +  -0.6245 0.9711 -0.6431  0.5202  -0.0751 
Current Account Balance/GDP  - -12.8460  5.8837  -2.1832**  0.0290  -3.5912 
Real Interest Rate Differential  +  -0.0249 0.0431 -0.5776  0.5636  -0.0051 
Real Effective Exchange Rate Overvaluation  +  0.0176 0.8100 0.0217  0.9827  0.0052 
Industrial Production Index  -  1.5460  5.3642  0.2882  0.7732  -0.0574 
Trade  Balance/GDP  -  -0.2030 0.2132 -0.9524  0.3409  -0.0561 
Stock Market Index  -  -0.8785  1.3779  -0.6376  0.5237  -0.1416 
Public  Debt/GDP  +  -0.3604 0.9025 -0.3994  0.6896  -0.0827 
Domestic Real Interest Rates  +  -0.0250  0.0433  -0.5777  0.5635  -0.0054 
Government  Changes  +  0.2226 2.6023 0.0770  0.8386  0.0594 
Oil  prices  +  -0.4871 1.5358 -0.3172  0.7511  -0.1058 
M1  +  -2.6120 1.9865 -1.3148  0.1886  -0.7298 
FDI/GDP  -  0.0124 0.0328 0.3791  0.7046  0.0032 
aMarginal effects are calculated at sample means. 
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Table 3. Coefficient Estimates of the Logit Models with Multiple Variables 









P>|z|  Marginal 
Effect 
Fiscal Balance/GDP  -  -5.4285 2.8166*  -1.9273  0.0539  -1.3118 
Foreign Liabilities/Foreign Assets of Banks  +  1.9160 1.1587*  1.6535  0.0982  0.5648 
Domestic Credit/GDP  +  10.7295 3.6747***  2.9197  0.0035  3.7963 
Short-Term Debt/Long-Term Debt  +  51.6572 8.8391***  5.8441  0.0000  17.9588 
Current Account Balance/GDP  -  -11.5144 6.5345***  -1.7620  0.0781  -3.7914 
Constant   -1.3146 0.3642  -3.6101  0.0003   
McFadden R-squared
10: 0.7739 
LR statistic (5 df)
11: 58.41967*** 
* Significant at the 10% level.  *** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 4. Predictive Performance of the Multiple Variable Logit Model 
  Cutoff Probability at 10%  Cutoff Probability at 20% 
Percentage of months with accurate crisis 
prediction 
87.18 %  73.08 % 
Percentage of months with accurate prediction of 
a tranquil period 
26.79 %  51.20 % 
Percentage of months with inaccurate crisis 
prediction 
12.82 %  26.92 % 
Percentage of months with inaccurate prediction 
of a tranquil period
 d
73.21 %  48.80 % 
a Crisis is accurately predicted if the estimated probability exceeds the probability threshold and a crisis starts in 
the course of the next 12 months. 
b A tranquil period has been accurately predicted if the estimated probability does not exceed the probability 
threshold and a crisis does not start in the next 12 months. 
c Crisis is inaccurately predicted if the estimated probability exceeds the probability threshold and a crisis does 
not start in the course of the next 12 months. 
d A tranquil period has been inaccurately predicted if the estimated probability does not exceed the probability 
threshold and a crisis starts in the next 12 months. 
                                                           
10 McFadden R2 is a measure of the goodness-of-fit of a model that is obtained when the ratio of the log of the 
function maximum with a restriction on parameters (all parameters equal zero) and the log of the probability 
function maximum without the restriction regarding the parameters are deducted from one; it corresponds to R2 
as a measure of goodness-of-fit of models estimated by OLS (Krznar, 2004). 
11 LR measure is equal to the multiple of (-1) and the difference between the logarithm of the maximum of the 
probability function with a restriction on parameters (in this case the restriction requires all the parameters to be 
equal to zero) and an “average” logarithm of the function probability maximum without a restriction. Therefore 
a larger LR measure relates to a higher statistical significance of the model. LR measure is analogue to the F 
measure in the models estimated by OLS (Krznar, 2004). 
  12APPENDIX I 
A SUMMARY OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDIES USING LOGIT MODELS 
Reference  Sample / Period  Variables / Frequency  Crisis Index / Threshold  Significant Variables / 
Conclusions 
Goldfjan and Valdes (1997)  26 developing and developed 
countries (1984-1997) 
Monthly macroeconomic and 
financial variables 
weighted average of real 
exchange rate and reserve 
changes. Threshold: Mean + 3 
std. dev. 
Only exchange rate  
Klein and Marion (1997)   7 Latin American countries and 
Jamaica (1957-1991) 
Monthly financial, openness, 
and trade concentration 
variables 
Index and threshold of 
Kaminsky et al. (1997) 
Exchange rate and international 
reserves 
Kumar et al. (1998)   20 developing countries (1985-
1998) 
Monthly macroeconomic and 
financial variables 
Weighted average of real 
exchange rate and reserve 
changes. Threshold: Mean + 2 
std. dev. 
Output, exports and 
international reserves 
JP Morgan (1998)   25 industrial and emerging 
countries (1980-1997) 
Monthly macroeconomic and 
financial variables  
Changes of exchange rates. 
Threshold: Over 10 percent 
real depreciations of 
Number of local crashes and 
international reserves/debt 
Goldman Sachs (1998)   N/A  Monthly macroeconomic, 
political stability and financial 
variables 
Weighted average of three-
month exchange rate and 
reserve changes. Threshold: 
Not mentioned 
Credit booms, the real 
exchange rate, export growth, 
international reserves, stock 
prices, political risk 
Credit Suisse First Boston 
(2001)    
N/A  The real exchange rate, 
debt/exports, credit to the 
private sector, output, reserves/ 
imports, stock prices, oil prices 
and a regional contagion 
dummy 
Weighted average of three-
month exchange rate and 
reserve changes. Threshold: 
depreciation greater than 5 




Weller (2001)   19 emerging countries (1980-
1998) 
Monthly political freedom and 
capital mobility variables  
Used the list of banking crises 
in Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999). 
Financial liberalization 
Eliason and Kreuter (2001)   10 East Asian and Latin  Monthly macroeconomic,  Weighted averages of exchange  The index successfully portrays American countries (1990-
2000) 
financial, foreign and contagion 
variables 
rates and interest rates. 
Threshold: currency 
depreciations of more than 
10%, or the interest rate 
increases more than 20% 
the East Asian and Latin 
American crises of the 1990s  
Kumar et al. (2002)   32 developing countries (1985-
1999) 
Monthly macroeconomic and 
institutional variables 
Exchange rate changes. 
Threshold: Mean + 3 std. dev. 
No conclusive empirical 
evidence found 
Saqib (2002)   Brazil (1994-1998)  Monthly internal, external and 
political variables 
Same index as in Kaminsky et 
al. (1997) 
Political factors along with 
conventional factors explain the 
Brazilian crisis 
Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002)  
 
32 emerging market economies 
(1993-2001) 
Monthly external and internal 
macroeconomic variables 
Weighted average of real 
exchange rate, reserve and 
interest rate changes. 
Threshold: Mean + 3 std. dev. 
Only financial contagion 
Lestano et al. (2003)   Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Philippines, Singapore, South 
Korea and Thailand (1970-
2001) 
Monthly macroeconomic and 
financial data 
Index and threshold of 
Goldfjan and Valdes (1997) 
M1 and M2, bank deposits, 
GDP per capita and national 
savings, M2/foreign reserves, 
foreign reserves, real interest 
rate and inflation 
Manasse et al (2003)  47 Emerging market economies 
(1970-2002) 
Annual macroconomic data  (Investigated debt crises)  Indicators of external debt, 
macroeconomic conditions, and 
political economy factors 
Jacobs et al (2004)   Countries of Lestano et al. 
(2003) 
Variables of Lestano et al. 
(2003) 
Index and threshold of 
Goldfjan and Valdes (1997) 
M1, M2, GDP per capita, 
imports and national savings  
Krznar (2004)  Croatia (1996-2003)  Monthly macroeconomic and 
financial data 
Weighted average of  nominal 
exchange against the euro and 
international reserve change. 
Threshold:  Mean + 2 std. dev. 
R real exchange rate, balance 
of public finances/GDP, current 
account balance/GDP, inflation 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Balance/GDP  1.00 0.07  0.04  0.02  0.02 -0.06 0.07 -0.11 0.00 -0.08 -0.04 0.01 -0.07 0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.01  0.01  -0.01  0.03  0.01 0.01 
Central Bank Credit to 
Public Sector/GDP    1.00 0.40 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.31 0.00 -0.01  -0.05  -0.10  -0.02  -0.01  -0.05  0.11  -0.04  0.03  0.03  -0.01  0.00 -0.06  0.09 
Commercial Bank 
Deposits      1.00 0.15 -0.02  -0.04 0.33 0.09 -0.06 0.02 0.07  -0.06  -0.04  -0.04  0.29 0.00 0.14  0.12  0.04  -0.03  -0.09  0.16 
BSFI        1.00  0.04  0.05 -0.04 0.01  0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.08 -0.08 0.13 -0.01 0.01  0.03  -0.11  -0.02 0.03 0.18 
Domestic  Credit/GDP          1.00 0.23 0.05 -0.03 0.56  0.00 -0.76 0.98 0.00 0.72 -0.01  -0.03  -0.08  0.01  -0.06  0.96 0.00 0.04 
CPI  Growth            1.00 -0.06 0.05 0.24 -0.05  -0.06 0.25 0.12 0.27 0.00 -0.15  -0.05  0.01  0.00  0.23 -0.02  -0.17 
Excess  real  M1  balances              1.00  0.10  0.02  0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.19 0.02 -0.30 -0.06 0.04  0.02  0.03  0.15 -0.06 0.04 
Exports                1.00 -0.03 0.00 0.06 -0.03 0.30 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.07  -0.07  0.01  -0.01 0.04 -0.02 




           1.00  0.05  -0.02  0.03  0.05  0.08  0.04  -0.07  -0.01  -0.03  -0.04  -0.01  -0.03 
GDP  per  capita              1.00  -0.76  0.02  -0.57  -0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.01  -0.75  -0.07  0.02 
Government 
consumption/GDP               1.00  0.02  0.77  0.00  -0.02  -0.06  -0.03  -0.05  0.96  0.03  -0.02 
Imports                1.00  0.04  0.17  -0.10  0.01  -0.02  0.00  -0.02  -0.03  -0.03 
International 
Reserves/GDP                 1.00  -0.04  -0.01  -0.05  -0.04  -0.03  0.73  0.01  -0.42 
M2  Multiplier                  1.00 0.03 0.15  -0.03  -0.01 -0.19  -0.03  0.18 
US  Real  T-Bill  Rate                   1.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 -0.03  -0.09  -0.01 




                  1.00  0.01  0.00  -0.01  0.05 
Short-Term Debt/Long-
Term Debt                      1.00  -0.05  -0.04  -0.05 
Reserve  Money/GDP                        1.00  0.02  0.01 
Real Interest Rate 
Differential                          1.00  -0.03 
M2/International 
Reserves                           1 .   0 0
  15 
  16